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C00002 00002	The following story admits a far more ominous interpretation than
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The following story admits a far more ominous interpretation than
Pietila gives it.  Pietila, in my opinion, is the most perceptive
of the current batch of Moscow correspondents.  See the end for my
gloomy view.

n126  2354  02 Mar 85
BC-GERIATRIGARCHY-2takes-(Balt.)
     By Antero Pietila
    c. 1985 The Baltimore Sun
    
     Moscow - It is one of the paradoxes of Soviet life that in this
country of geriatric leadership, an unwritten rule makes it almost
impossible for people older than 40 to join the Communist Party. As a
consequence, almost 64 per cent of the party's 18 million members are
under 50 years old.
     Yet, six of the eleven members of the ruling Politburo are over 70
- the oldest is 79 - and the average age of that leadership group is
close to 68.
     ''You ask me why everybody is so old? The answer is simple. Old men
at the top keep electing other old men,'' one historian explained.
     In China, the Communist Party, government bureaucracy and even the
military are currently undergoing a rejuvenation campaign under the
80-year-old Politburo chairman leader Deng Xiaoping. Forced
retirements are the order of the day.
     Could the same happen in the Soviet Union?
     There are some signs that that may be attempted here, too, in the
next few months.
     These signs come at a time, when powerful elements in the military
and in the KGB security apparatus are becoming increasingly impatient
about the inertia that has characterized this country and the Kremlin
leadership since the latter period of Leonid I. Brezhnev's 18-year
rule. Yuri V. Andropov, of course, tried to shake up things a bit,
until he fell ill, died and was replaced by Konstantin U. Chernenko.
     With President Reagan's push of the United States into space age
military research, those elements now have a reason to be even more
impatient. Significantly, they see a direct link between the
Kremlin's geriatric leadership and the Soviet Union's backwardness in
such critical high-tech areas as microprocessors and computers.
     Thus, pressure is building here for some change. Unlike in China,
it would not not be change that would, at least initially, result in
drastic economic reforms. Rather, it would center on purging the
party apparatus and the Communist Party Central Committee, whose more
than 300 members elect the politburo members.
     For several reasons, a unique opportunity seems to be arising here
for changes in the leadership.
     For one thing, President Chernenko's continuing poor health - and
the nature of his illnesses - make it clear his rule is approaching
the end. His likely successor will be Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the
titular number 2 party secretary and the Politburo's youngest member.
At 54, he is 19 years younger than Mr. Chernenko.
     If this happens, Mr. Gorbachev, just to solidify his grip on the
party leadership, has to bring his own people in.
     A new Soviet leader ordinarily cannot do that, but has to live with
the old Politburo as well as the old party and government
bureaucracy. In that respect, he is handicapped in comparison to any
new American president, who can appoint virtually thousands of his
supporters to anything from cabinet posts and ambassadorships to key
positions in the federal bureaucracy.
     Assuming that Mr. Chernenko's rule will end within the next six
months, his successor could alter the balance of power in his favor
in a way rare in recent Soviet history.
     The reason is the forthcoming 27th Party Congress, which is
expected to be held this November or December.
     The Congress will be a milestone event, because it will try to
instill some realism into this country by adopting a new platform to
replace the current Khrushschev-era party program. That document has
become increasingly embarassing: It confidently and ambitiously still
talks about overtaking the united states by 1980.
     Some 5,000 delegates will be elected to the party congress. It is
this election process - which starts with the selection of leaders of
local party organizations and then moves upward, culminating in the
designation of the congress delegates - that will give Mr.
Chernenko's successor his opportunity to use regular procedures to
rejuvenate the party. It also will allow him to pack the hall with
his own men - and make sure that the new Central Committee will
support him.
     Of course, that will not not immediately remove the dead wood from
the Politburo. But that problem will solve itself in due course,
natural laws being what they are.
     That a leadership purge of this type may be in the offing is hinted
by comments in authoritative publications recently.
     The newly-published revised history of the Communist Party ends
with a call to the rank and file to criticize their leaders.
     ''Criticism - and self-criticism - is a major principle of inner
party democracy, of critical attitude of Communists toward one
another. This is a sure method of molding the party cadres, of
forming in people a responsible attitude toward what they have been
asked to do,'' the party history says.
     Mr. Gorbachev, the heir-apparent, goes even further.
     This can be gauged from an editorial in new issue of the party's
theoretical journal, Kommunist, which was written shortly after Mr.
Gorbachev recently took over the chief ideologist's post from
President Chernenko himself.
     The editorial is one of the toughest pieces of theoretical writing
that has been published in this country since the times of Josef V.
Stalin. It advocates harsh measures for loafers - and renegade
Communists.
     Thus, the Kommunist editorial, after referring to ''the complete
liquidation of antagonistic classes in our society,'' talks about the
need to recognize that enemies of socialism still exist in the Soviet
Union - and even in the Communist Party.
     ''If a person is in an antagonistic conflict with the socialistic
social relations, with social discipline, why should we try to find
another name for this?'' the editorial asks.
     It continues: ''It is difficult to see through a deceiving person,
who goes out of his way to hide his individualistic nature. It is
easier to see through an individualist, who thinks he is right in his
egoism. But both should get what they deserve. The conduct of both
should be marked antisocialist with all ensuing consequences. It is
of special importance as far as those who managed to join the party
are concerned''.
     What Kommunist writes cannot cannot be taken lightly. Thus, there
is a reason believe that an intraparty purge may be attempted in the
next few months. That also would mean that the forthcoming party
elections would not not be just another rubberstamp exercise to
re-elect the incumbents.
     And if a hunt for ''antisocialists'' begins in earnest in Soviet
life in general and in the party in particular, then that
unquestionably will also touch some of the party bosses, who have
permitted those elements to exist.

*****

Comments:

Like many Soviet Party statements, the Kommunist editorial, at least
judging from Pietila's excerpt, doesn't spell out what it means.  Like
foreigners, Soviet officials have to puzzle out what it may mean, and
perhaps it will arouse fears in many of them, which may be its intention.
However, the editorial admits a far more ominous interpretation than
Pietila gives it.  A purge of the old is unlikely to be its primary
interpretation in the Party.  After all Gorbachev still depends on the old
to be elected General Secretary.

Another interpretation is a forthcoming purge of people in the party
and officialdom who have been tolerant of dissent, deviation and
individualism in culture, economics and science in
the past.  The emphasis on concealed opposition meant in Stalin's
time, and may mean now, that going along with the Party line as
it presently exists won't be enough.  Having refrained from persecution
in the past will be reason for being regarded as antisocialist.
Moreover, there is no hint of a limit on what may be done to
antisocialists.  The reference to concealed opposition may mean
that accusing someone of past deviant remarks or opposition may again,
become the way to get ahead --- as it was in Stalin's time.

If this editorial represents Gorbachev's ``platform'' running for
General Secretary, he is appealing to Stalinist ideas.  He may see
himself as the new Stalin.  Gorbachev's good impression in Britain
may mean nothing.  Stalin made an excellent impression on
Western statesmen when he chose to do so.

Once Stalinism takes the form of purging high level people on the
basis of accusations of concealed views, it may go much farther
than Gorbachev presently intends.  It generates thoughts of ``I'd
better accuse him before he accuses me''.

It might be worthwhile to translate the Kommunist editorial and publicize
it in the West as a possible prelude to a new Stalinism.  It can do no
harm, and it may even scare some Politburo members into better sense.

Question for someone who follows what is written in Kommunist.  Is this
kind of language new, or does Kommunist thunder like this every so often?

John McCarthy